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Summary 
International carbon offsets have been promoted since the Kyoto Protocol and an 
increasing number of countries have implemented or proposed cap-and-trade schemes with 
international trading, even though with quantitative or qualitative restrictions. Those limits 
reflect the trade-off between economic efficiency, distributional issues, and the need for 
additionality of foreign mitigation measures. Ceilings are also justified on the ground that 
international offsets undermine the capability of climate policy to induce and diffuse 
technological change. This paper addresses these issues in a second-best setting that 
explicitly considers the interplay between multiple externalities. We evaluate numerically 
how limits to the size, the timing, and the participation in an international carbon market 
affect the macroeconomic costs of climate policy, international financial transfers, and the 
incentive to carry out innovation. Results indicate that when constraints on international 
offsets are moderate, such as limiting their use to at most 15% of regional abatement, 
efficiency losses are small because they are partly compensated by more technological 
change and energy market effects, although specific regional patterns are identified. 
Regarding financial outflows from OECD countries, already a 15% ceiling would limit 
financial transfers significantly. Provisions of this kind are in line with some of the most 
recent policy proposals in OECD countries.    
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distributional issues, and the need for additionality of foreign mitigation measures. Ceilings are also justified 
on the ground that international offsets undermine the capability of climate policy to induce and diffuse 
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1.  Introduction 
Since the Kyoto Protocol Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), international offsets have been 
considered an important ingredient of any efficient solution to climate change. International 
emission trading has the potential to reduce compliance costs because it makes it possible to exploit 
low cost mitigation options wherever they are located. Following this argument, numerous regional 
and sub-regional carbon market initiatives, either regulated or on a voluntary base, have emerged 
especially in developed countries
3.   
 
International offsets have also been a controversial issue. It is an important cost-containment 
mechanism, but if not well-designed it may undermine environmental effectiveness and 
technological change. In 2000, a lack of agreement on the implementation procedures of the Kyoto 
mechanisms led to the failure of negotiations at Hague.  In 2004, the EU linking directive 
established the possibility to use Kyoto credits in the EU-ETS, without any limit. During the second 
Phase of emission trading, the EU decided to limit the quantity and the quality of offsets to avoid 
the price collapse faced during the first Phase.  
 
Most of the existing or proposed cap-and-trade schemes include ceilings on international offsets. 
For example, the Waxman-Markey Bill allows approximately 1 Billion tons of CO2 annually for 
international offsets (only half of this figure is considered in the currently discussed Senate bill by 
Kerry and Boxer). The European Union has proposed a cap between 1.4 and 1.6 Billion tons for the  
period between 2008 and 2020, an amount that could be increased in the case of more ambitious 
reduction. The Canadian emission trading scheme which should be launched in 2010 also contains a 
10% limitation to the purchase of international offsets from CDM. Japan's newly elected Prime 
Minister has increased the target on emission reduction from 8 to 25% by 2020 and he has proposed 
to cover up to 60% of its emission target through foreign carbon credits
4.  
 
A well-designed, global cap-trade-system has the potential to create the right incentives to engage 
developing countries (Wara and Victor 2008, Frankel 2008). However, if most of the reduction 
burden were allocated to industrialised countries, then an unconstrained scheme would create a 
system of transfers from developed to developing countries. These flows might be substantial and 
arguably controversial. For example, Jacoby et. al (2008) found that the size of north-south side-
                                                 
3 For a review of cap and trade schemes around the world see Capoor and Ambrosi (2009). 
4 http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/un/assembly2009/pm0922.html; http://www.pointcarbon.com/news/1.1272010 
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payments would already reach US$ 400 Billion in 2020. This is four times the current spending on 
Official Development Assistance
5. Furthermore, a well-functioning carbon market requires a solid 
infrastructure that guarantees the integrity of the transactions and provides market participants with 
reliable information. It also requires high quality monitoring, reporting, and verification. The 
experience with CDM, the largest existing international carbon market, has already revealed major 
problems concerning credit verification and quality certification of the projects involved (Wara and 
Victor 2008). As long as these issues are not solved, institutional or administrative issues are likely 
to delay the establishment of a global market.  
 
An additional line of reasoning is often promoted to discourage heavy reliance on international 
carbon offsets. When a polluting country faces the choice of whether innovating or purchase carbon 
credits, the cheapest option will be selected (Driesen 2003). If permits are cheaper than investment 
costs in mitigation options at home, emission trading will create an incentive to shift abatement 
abroad, reducing total compliance costs, but also lowering the incentive to carry out innovation. 
This is a known argument (see for example Hourcade et al. 1999), which has been proposed again 
recently within the EU-ETS. Since the price collapse in 2006, the EU Commissions has favoured 
quantitative and qualitative restrictions on international offsets (de Sépibus 2008).  
 
As discussed in Karp and Zhao (2009), if limits to purchase credits are not large, economic losses 
might be modest and therefore it may be worthy to use them. These limits could avoid huge 
transfers to developing countries, make the agreement more appealing for industrialised countries, 
and stimulate innovation. The argument in favour of ceilings might be reinforced in a second-best 
world. Most estimates of the cost-saving effect of unrestricted emission trading schemes hold in a 
first-best world (e.g. Weyant and Hill 1999, Bohm 1999, Chander et al. 2002,  Paltsev et al. 2008, 
Richels 2007). When the only distortion is global pollution, international emission trading generates 
efficiency gains. However, the theory of a second-best world (Lipsey and Lancaster 1956) suggests 
that addressing only one of the  various market distortions,  will not necessarily improve welfare. 
Environmental economic literature suggests that multiple policy instruments should be employed, 
see Jaffe et al. (2003), Jaffe et al. (2005) and Bennear and Stavins (2007). In practice, however, 
designing several instruments can be complicated, and despite the various forms of regulation used 
                                                 
5  The amount of money that developed countries should spend for climate change in developing countries has been  the 
leading question of the latest Conference of Parties held in Copenhagen last December. The amount of annual funds 
agreed upon (US$ 30  Billion  from 2010 to 2012 and US$ 100 Billion by 2020 ) is much less than what developing 
countries demanded for.   4
today, a market-based solution aimed at pricing CO2 is widely regarded as the most probable 
solution for the case of global warming.   
 
The question of interest here is whether, in the presence of multiple externalities, restricting the use 
of international carbon offsets is a second-best policy recommendation. Market failures associated 
with the environmental externality interact with market failures associated with innovation and the 
diffusion of technologies. Climate policy is targeted at the environmental externality, but it is likely 
to have second order effects on the technology externality as well. Limiting international emission 
trading would lead to welfare losses in a first-best world. In a second-best world this might not be 
the case.  
 
Few studies have addressed this issue. Golombek and Hoel (2006) analysed the welfare 
implications of trade in carbon permits in a second-best world where technology externalities are 
not internalised. They found that the second-best optimum is characterised by marginal costs of 
abatement exceeding the Pigovian tax in all countries. A tighter emission requirement is thus a way 
of compensating for the lack of technology policy. In a follow-up paper, Golombek and Hoel 
(2008) found that the price of carbon should differ across heterogeneous countries in the second-
best agreement. If the quota are assigned according to the second-best optimum, then there should 
be no emission trading. Whether emission trading is welfare enhancing or not, is an empirical 
question.  
 
However, hardly any numerical evaluation of the economic role of international carbon offsets 
considers the role of technology externalities. Quantitative assessments in a second-best framework 
have mostly explored the role of pre-existing distortionary taxes. Babiker et al. (2004) and Paltsev 
et al. (2007) analysed the role of international emission trading in a second-best world, where the 
carbon price interacts with pre-exiting distortionary taxes. In that setting, terms-of-trade 
deterioration and tax-interaction effects prevail and emission trading leads to welfare losses in some 
regions.  In the same manner, McKibbin et al. (1999) demonstrated how a country may lose from 
falling terms of trade after engaging in international emissions trading.  
 
Buonanno et al. (2000) assessed the pros and cons of introducing ceilings to emission trading in a 
model with endogenous technical change (ETC-RICE). They found little support for quantitative 
restrictions, which have negative impacts on both efficiency and equity. Although quantitative 
restrictions foster technological innovation, its long-run positive effects on economic growth are   5
lower than the additional economic costs. Their model does not include international spillovers of 
knowledge and experience and therefore it underestimates the benefits of technological innovation.  
 
This paper provides a systematic and quantitative assessment of the role of international offsets in 
climate change policies. Using an integrated assessment model (see Section 2 and the Appendix) 
that features both environmental and technology externalities, we evaluate the impacts of offsets 
availability on macroeconomic costs, financial transfers, and innovation.  
 
Results show that in the presence of a climate policy consistent with a 530 ppm-eq stabilisation 
target, where developed countries initially take on the largest obligations, an unrestricted 
international carbon market would lead to rapidly growing financial transfers. Limiting access to 
international offsets makes abatement more costly globally and for the OECD as a whole, but the 
efficiency losses are small for moderate trading restrictions. Constraining offsets to at most 15% of 
regional abatement is approximately in line with the current proposals of Boxer and Kerry  and with 
the EU-ETS. This would not affect welfare in the US, though it would result in a loss for Europe. 
However, financial flows to developing countries would be significantly reduced. Despite the 
revenue loss on the carbon market, non-OECD regions would be compensated by higher 
technological spillovers and lower energy prices. A limited access to international offsets spurs 
more innovation in constrained regions (OECD), which are also the most R&D-intensive countries.  
Considering the effects on macroeconomic costs, financial flows, and innovation, our results 
indicate that a moderate quantitative limit on international offsets might be a second-best policy 
recommendation.  
 
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 describes the scenario set-up and the 
model. Section 3 illustrates the macroeconomic implications when international offsets can be used 
without constraints. Section 4 examines the consequences of restricting the use of permit trading. 
Section 5 analyses the results for United States and Europe. Section 6 summarises and concludes. 
 
 
2.  Design of the climate scenario and methodology 
The choice of the climate scenario is important for the analysis of carbon trading, since the size of 
the market depends on the overall stringency of the climate objective as well as the regional 
repartition of the mitigation burden. In this exercise, we consider a climate policy with a long-run 
stabilisation objective of 530 CO2-eq ppm (3.5 W/m^2), where most of the initial mitigation effort 
is on developed regions. A target of this kind is less stringent than what is required to achieve the 2   6
degrees Celsius objective, but would nonetheless necessitate very significant global mitigation in 
the next few decades. More stringent commitments in the developed countries match the graduation 
approach envisaged by the UNFCCC, aimed at accounting for differentiated responsibilities.  
 
Table 1 describes regional commitments to be achieved by 2050. OECD countries subscribe to an 
allocation requiring a 90% cut of GHGs
6 by 2050 compared to 2005 levels. Non-OECD countries 
are allowed to increase emissions by 20% which, compared to our baseline projections, implies a 
reduction of almost 50%. Commitment starting dates have also been differentiated between 
developed and developing regions, with a 10 year-delay in non-OECD regions. We assume that 
beyond 2050, all regions will cooperate to reach the long-term stabilisation target and each region 
will be  allocated emission permits proportionally to the emission share in 2050. 
 





Emission reduction  
compared to 2005 
Emission reduction 
compared to BaU 
OECD  2015 -90% -93% 
Non-OECD  2025 +20% -47% 
WORLD    -26%  -61% 
 
 
The chosen scheme shares the main characteristics of other policy architectures recently proposed 
in the literature (Victor 2007, Bosetti et al. 2008, Bosetti and Frankel 2009, Frankel 2008). It 
allocates an ambitious reduction to industrialised regions and it delays effort in developing 
countries. Since international emission trading starts in 2020, developing countries can benefit from 
their position as net sellers and from the related inflows of financial resources.  
 
In 2020, OECD countries have a target of 18% compared to 2005, and the EU is assumed to comply 
with the 20% reduction target
7. Compared to 2005, United States reduces emissions by 14%, Korea, 
South Africa and Australia by 18%, Canada, Japan and New Zealand by 17%. These reductions are 
comparable to what policy makers have been proposing recently. In the United States the Waxman-
                                                 
6 We only consider the Kyoto gases and do not account for the mitigation option of reduced emissions from 
deforestation and land use degradation (REDD). Although it is plausible to think that tropical deforestation will play a 
role in a future international carbon market, concerns with its readiness and reliability led us to exclude it from the 
mitigation basket.   7
Markey Bill (the American Clean-Energy and Security Act, or ACES Act 8 ) acknowledges a 17% 
reduction by 2020.  In Japan the newly elected Prime Minister has proposed a reduction of 25% by 
2020, relative to 1990. Similarly, Canada has recommended a reduction of 20% . In Australia, 




The economic and financial implications of this policy are analysed using the integrated assessment 
model WITCH
10. WITCH (Bosetti et al. 2006, Bosetti et al. 2009) is a hybrid energy-economy 
model with perfect foresight.  The WITCH model can characterise second-best equilibria because it 
considers different sources of market failure: the environmental externality, international 
knowledge and experience spillovers, and carbon leakage through international energy markets. A 
full description of how the externalities are represented and solved in the WITCH model can be 
found in the Appendix. 
 
The model includes a range of technology options that describe the final use of energy and power 
generation. Electricity can be generated using low carbon options, such as nuclear and hydroelectric 
power, coal with carbon capture and sequestration (CCS), wind turbines, and photovoltaic panels.  
We model diffusion processes via experience curves, though only for the innovative technologies. 
The model also includes Learning-By-Searching in which R&D investments endogenously lead to 
improvements in energy efficiency and to reduced costs of advanced low carbon technologies. 
 
Both energy innovation and diffusion are activities characterised by international spillovers (Bosetti 
et. al. 2008a).  Each region can benefit from the stock of knowledge developed elsewhere through 
domestic investments. However, the appropriation of the benefits from knowledge spillovers 
requires local investments to build up absorptive capacity. A time lag in the spillover of knowledge 
pool is also assumed. On the contrary, international experience spillovers are free and they are 
determined by the global deployment of the technology.  
 
Besides technology spillovers, two additional channels of interaction are the international markets 
of exhaustible resources and the carbon market. International prices of fossil fuels are determined 
                                                                                                                                                                  
7 The European Union has proposed reductions up to 30% by 2020, compared to 1990, in the presence of an 
international agreement. In this paper we assume a 20% reduction by 2020, compared to 1990, because the policy 
becomes global only after 2020, http://ec.europa.eu/environment/climat/climate_action.htm. 
8 http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=h111-2454 
9 http://www.climatechange.gov.au/ 
10 See www.witchmodel.org for model description and related papers.    8
by total extraction, which in turn depends on regional consumption. When there is a climate policy, 
countries buy and sell carbon permits until the international carbon market clears, determining a 
unique global carbon price. 
 
The structure of the model allows us to consider  the most salient features of the climate mitigation 
policy, and to do so in a second-best setting. Although this model is a step-up over standard 
integrated assessment modelling that normally features only the climate externality, it  falls short of 
thoroughly representing a second-best world. For example, no international trade of capital is 
assumed and pre-exiting distortionary taxes and subsidies are not accounted for in this exercise. Our 
model captures market failures related to international spillovers only in the energy sector, as no 
general purpose R&D is assumed. No learning is considered for known, yet potentially improvable 
technologies, such as nuclear power and carbon capture and storage (CCS). Thus, this exercise  
provides an account of only some of the most relevant sources of global interaction. 
 
 
3.  No restrictions on the use of international carbon offsets 
We begin by evaluating the implications of the climate stabilisation scenario on economic activity 
and carbon market when no exogenous constraint is imposed on international permit trading. We 
refer to this case as the “full offsets hypothesis”. Full cooperation is assumed to be supported by a 
fully-fledged, perfectly functioning, international carbon market, which is operative from 2020 
onward.  
 
3.1 Macroeconomic costs 
The macroeconomic costs induced by the chosen stabilisation policy are reported in Table 2, in 
absolute levels and in percentage terms. OECD countries face higher costs as they have signed upon 
the tightest commitments. Non-OECD countries slightly gain until mid century, mostly due to 
permit revenues, but lose in the long-term.  
 
Table 2. Global and regional macroeconomic costs of climate stabilisation policy under the 
“full offsets hypothesis.” Consumption losses discounted at 3% discount rate, 2005-2100 
Consumption OECD  Non-OECD  WORLD 
US$ Trillion  26.19 1.88  28.07 
Percentage of BaU 
consumption  1.68% 0.18%  1.07% 
                 Losses are gross of climate change damages. Negative numbers indicate gains.   9
 
The 1% global figure lies within the range reported in the literature (IPCC 2007), though one should 
keep in mind that the climate stabilisation objective considered here is not very ambitious compared 
to the 2 degrees Celsius. The RECIPE model intercomparison analysed the economics of a 
comparable climate policy and it found that stabilisation costs range between 1.4% and 0.1% of 
global discounted consumption (Luderer et al. 2009). Low costs are also due to the assumption of 
immediate participation and full flexibility among greenhouse gases abatement options. Departure 
from any of these assumptions increases costs substantially. For example, Bosetti et al. (2009) 
found that limited availability of mitigation technologies would impose an additional penalty of 
roughly 70% whereas a 20-year delay in global action would increase costs by 160%.  The role of 
delayed participation of developing countries was also emphasised in the recent EMF22 modelling 
comparison exercise (Clarke et al. 2009). 
 
3.2 The carbon market and financial implications: the “full offsets hypothesis” 
Without any restriction, countries rely on the international carbon market, an important element of 
flexibility that increases efficiency. Table 3 shows the evolution of the carbon market over time. 
The market size is already significant in 2020, when almost 3 Billion tons of CO2 (equal to roughly 
half of today’s emissions in the US) are exchanged internationally, enough to require the 
establishment of considerable institutional and monitoring capacity. The initially low carbon price 
(due to the assumption of global participation and wide basket of GHGs) is such that the market 
value is contained at the outset, but grows  significantly over time, driven by the convex path of the 
carbon price.  
 

















2020  2.8 7  41%  4  11  0.02% 
2025  3.0 14  22%  26  76  0.10% 
2030  3.3 20  16.%  58  193  0.22% 
2050  7.1 46  16%  319 2260  1.74% 
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The rapid expansion of the carbon market mobilises significant financial resources. In absolute 
values, the transfers at stake increase from amounts comparable to current Official Development 
Assistance (ODA) flows already in 2025 (US$ 76 Billion, or 0.1% of Gross World Product) to over 
US$ 2 Trillion in 2050. As a comparison, today’s OECD imports of oil (at a price of 70$/bbl) 
equate roughly US$ 700 Billion. In terms of regional GDP, outflows from OECD regions increase 
to US$ 1.7 Trillion in 2050, which is more than 2% of OECD GDP (Table 4).  
 
 
Table 4. International carbon market under the “full offsets hypothesis”. Financial flows as a 
percentage of regional GDP 
  OECD Non-OECD 
2020  0.02% -0.05% 
2025  0.14% -0.29% 
2030  0.33% -0.59% 
2050  2.37% -2.91% 
Positive numbers represent outflows, negative numbers represent inflows 
 
 
It stands that a well functioning international carbon market could provide the means to finance 
climate change. However, if unrestricted, the amount of transfers required may eventually be too 
high to be acceptable. Already in 2030, it would be above what Annex I Parties agreed to forego in 
the Copenhagen Accord, which acknowledges US$ 100 Billion per year starting from 2020.  
 
Therefore, OECD countries face a trade-off. On the one hand, laissez fair would maximise cost-
effectiveness and contain economic costs. On the other hand, it would entail substantial financial 
flows, which may undermine the willingness of industrialised countries to commit. If the climate 
externality were the only distortion in the economy, restrictions to carbon trade would create a 
wedge in marginal abatement costs across countries, reducing economic efficiency. However, 
restricting trade might be a second-best policy recommendation.  At the same time, a perfectly 
functioning international carbon market might not be available in 2020 because technical problems 
such as the lack of institutional capacity, reliable monitoring, and verification systems might delay 
or fragment the establishment of a global market.  
 
The next section tackles both issues and it considers a departure from the “full offsets hypothesis” 
along three directions:  
   11
•  “When”: the establishment of an international carbon market is delayed to a future date 
between 2030 and 2045 
•  “How much”: until 2045, only a fraction of abatement, ranging from 20% to 10% of 
regional abatement, can be met through the international carbon market 
•  “Where”: only a subset of regions joins from the outset (2020) of the international 
carbon market. A selected number of other regions join in 2045. 
 
4.  Departing from the “full offsets hypothesis”  
 
4.1 Restrictions along the “when” dimension 
Although OECD regions hope to have an OECD-wide emission trading scheme in 2015, the lack of 
international policy coordination may slow down the whole process, postponing the establishment 
of a global carbon market. If this were the case, OECD countries would be required to  compensate 
for the missing trade with additional domestic abatement. 
 
Table 5 reports consumption losses when access to international offsets is delayed over time by 10, 
15, 20, or 25 years. Postponing the establishment of an international carbon market increases global 
macroeconomic costs moderately for delays until  2030-2035, but waiting until  2045 raises the 
policy bill by about 50%. This is driven by additional losses in OECD regions. Instead, in non-
OECD the (moderate) consumption costs are halved, reducing the global penalty. Welfare 
improvements in these regions are a second-best result, driven by positive technology spillovers, 
and lower energy prices. They also depend on the assumption that non-OECD countries commit to 
considerably milder emission reduction objectives compared to OECD. 
 
Table 5: Regional macroeconomic losses of climate policy when the use of international offsets  
is delayed (“when” dimension).  
Consumption losses discounted at 3% discount rate, 2005-2100 
  OECD Non-OECD World 
Full offsets  1.68% 0.18% 1.07% 
from 2030  1.81% 0.11% 1.12% 
from 2035  1.90% 0.08% 1.17% 
from 2040  2.26% 0.05% 1.37% 
from 2045  2.70% 0.08% 1.64% 
Negative entries indicate consumption gains   12
When trade is restricted, alternative and more expensive mitigation options are adopted, driving up 
compliance costs. To meet the stabilisation target OECD countries rely mostly on two options: 
contraction of fossil fuel consumption, expansion of investments in energy-saving innovation and 
low-carbon technologies, such as Carbon Capture and Sequestration (CCS), renewables (Wind and 
Solar), nuclear power and breakthrough technologies
11.  
 
With limited access to international offsets, OECD regions substantially decrease their demand of 
all fossil fuels (traditional gas, coal, and oil), oil in particular. The reduced use of oil in OECD 
countries lowers its international price, benefiting non-OECD regions. This effect is also known as 
energy market effect, which is one of the possible sources of carbon leakage. A second channel that 
is not discussed in this paper works through changes in terms-of-trade and international 
competitiveness of energy-intensive industries
12. 
 
All in all, the contraction of oil demand in OECD countries is only partially offset by carbon 
leakage in non-OECD, which increases the oil demand by 11% (on average) between 2020 and 
2040. Figure 1 shows that in the extreme case of a 2045 delay, these two effects result in a global 
demand cutback of 16% in 2040. The international price is reduced by almost 4% compared to the 
case in which full offsets are available. It should be mentioned that most of the oil price reduction 
occurs when implementing a stabilisation policy, in the full offset case, where the oil price falls by 
about 30% in 2050 and 70% in 2010, with respect to the baseline. Thus the additional impact of 











                                                 
11 We analyse these results for the most stringent case in which trade starts in 2045. The other cases have similar, but 
smaller magnitude effects.  
12 Burniaux and Oliveira Martins (2000) assessed the relative contribution of each of the two channels and concluded 
that the non-energy market effect is less important than expected.   13
Figure 1: International oil market. Price and consumption when delaying the use of 





























































































Achieving a tight commitment in the absence of international carbon market requires scaling up 
investments in innovation and deployment of low-carbon technologies. Since innovation and 
investments in low-carbon technologies generate positive spillovers, they induce more 
technological change and thus lower abatement costs in all regions. In other words, the additional 
costs paid by OECD regions lead to additional benefits in non-OECD.  
 
Figure 2 depicts the global path of investments in wind and solar. As mentioned in Section 2, 
investment costs in wind and solar decline with global deployment. Learning-By-Doing thus 
generates international positive spillovers.  During the transition period without permit trading 
(2020-2040), OECD investments in wind and solar are raised to match the more stringent abatement 
target. Investments in non-OECD initially remain at levels comparable or slightly lower than in the 
full offsets hypothesis, but eventually increase as well. This pattern is due to the reduction in global 
investment costs caused by additional investment effort in the OECD. Investments drop below the 
full offsets case only in 2040, in anticipation of the opening to international offsets in 2045, but they 
remain higher thereafter. The additional investment cost reduction for wind and solar induced by 
the trade restriction decreases over time because of the decreasing marginal benefits of investments, 
but nonetheless remains positive throughout the whole century. Such path dependencies help lower   14
the climate policy costs in the long-term, but require an additional effort in the beginning, that is 
mostly faced by developed countries. 
 



































































































































A similar result is observed for investments in energy efficiency R&D, which globally increase 
throughout the century, but by a larger magnitude during the transition period without emission 
trading. The global increase is mostly driven by additional investments in OECD countries. Non-
OECD countries slightly reduce their R&D effort in the short-run, but increase it after 2035.  
 
4.2 Restrictions along the “how much” dimension 
This section assumes that an international carbon market will already be in place in 2020, but with 
quantitative restrictions on the use of international offsets, mimicking most of the existing and 
proposed cap-and-trade schemes.  
Table 6 illustrates the regional shares of abatement that would be met from international offsets in 
the absence of any form of market restriction. Without any ceiling, and for this given distribution of 
allowances, developed countries would find it optimal to buy between 18% and 54% of their 
abatement on the international market. Already a mild restriction of 20% would be binding for most 
developed countries, especially in the short-run and in Europe. The United States is right at the 
limit.    15
 
Table  6: Regional shares of abatement met from international carbon market. Net import of 
permits over total abatement under “full offsets hypothesis” 
  USA Europe  Other  OECD 
2020  31% 54%  44% 
2025  22% 42%  36% 
2030  18% 35%  32% 
2035  20% 34%  31% 
2040  20% 31%  29% 
2045  20% 29%  29% 
 
 
The macroeconomic costs of the stabilisation policy when only up to  20%, 15% or 10% of total 
abatement in each region can be done with international offsets are reported in Table 7. In terms of 
global consumption losses, a mild restriction such as 20% creates costs that are comparable to 
postponing trade to 2030 (1.12% consumption loss). Tighter restrictions (10%) have costs 
comparable to postponing trade to at least 2035 (1.17% consumption loss). 
 
The dynamics of regional costs depends not only on the interactions between the effects outlined 
before (energy market and technology spillovers), but also on the trading position of each region. In 
the short-term, net sellers (non-OECD) tend to lose because of the contraction of the market and, as 
a consequence, of the carbon price. The non-OECD regions supply is rationed and therefore they 
emit more. However, they anticipate that after 2045 there will be a lager demand of permits and 
therefore they still keep emissions below the initial allocation. Throughout the century, limiting 
trade to 10% of regional abatement increases non-OECD welfare by about 40% because revenue 
losses on the carbon market are offset by the energy market effects and technology spillovers. 
 
The effect on net buyers (OECD) depends on whether the limit is binding or not. When the limit is 
binding, the region loses because more expensive abatement options have to substitute for imported 
credits. This occurs especially in Europe. If the limit is not binding, the region gains because carbon 
permits are cheaper. This is the case of the US where in 2030 the 20% restriction is not binding (see 
also Section 3)
13.   
 
                                                 
13 It is interesting to note that Buonanno et al. 2000, in the different policy setting of the Kyoto Protocol and with a 
different model without international technology spillovers found a similar result for the US.    16
Table 7: Regional macroeconomic losses of climate stabilisation policy when limiting the 
use of international offsets (“how much” dimension). Consumption losses discounted at 
3% discount rate, 2005-2100 
 
  OECD Non-OECD WORLD 
Full offsets  1.68% 0.18% 1.07% 
20%  1.76% 0.14% 1.11% 
15%  1.84% 0.12% 1.15% 
10%  1.97% 0.11%  1.22% 
Negative entries indicate consumption gains 
 
 
 To quantify the contribution of the energy market effect and technology spillovers, we consider 
three variations of the 15% scenario in which either or both effects are switched off
14. Table 8 
shows the macroeconomic losses of each case expressed in US$ Trillion. Figures indicate that the 
technology spillover effect is somewhat larger than the energy market effect, though in both cases 
the efficiency losses are small when compared to the overall policy costs shown in Table 2 by a few 
percentage points. The reason for this, as noted above, is that the stringent climate stabilisation 
policy considered in this paper requires a drastic switch of the energy system from a fossil fuel 
based to a low carbon one even in the case with full access to international offsets. This limits the 
additional room for reduction in the prices of energy and low carbon fuels when trade is 
constrained. 
 
The technology spillovers channel is found to be higher in OECD regions. Despite being closer to 
the technology frontier, developed countries have to comply with a very stringent domestic 
commitment (especially when trade is limited) that requires fast and major investments in low 
carbon mitigation options, such as wind and solar. Thus, the gains of equal reduction of investment 
costs in renewables (given by the assumption of global learning by doing) benefits developed 
countries more than developing ones. On the contrary, the energy market effect is larger for Non-
OECD countries, which are confronted with less demanding mitigation obligations and can 




                                                 
14 Specifically, we ran three additional simulations of the 15% trade restriction case in which we fixed the costs of either 
fossil fuels or low carbon technologies characterised by spillovers to the values of the full offsets policy scenario.   17
Table 8: Assessing the role of energy market effect and technology spillovers. 
Consumption losses compared to the 15% case  (US$ Trillion) 
  OECD 
Non-
OECD WORLD 
Energy market effect  0.11 0.40  0.51 
Technology spillovers  0.88 0.32  1.19 
Both  0.97 0.68  1.65 
 
 
Another prominent argument used to justify ceilings on international offsets is to limit the flows of 
financial resources from OECD to other regions. The question is whether it is worthy to bear 
additional economic costs in order to reduce financial outflows. Figure 3 depicts the financial 
outflows from OECD regions under different restrictions. In the short-term (2020) financial 
implications of unrestricted trade are small, but they grow very rapidly over time. Already in 2025, 
the amount spent on the carbon market would equate current OECD expenditure on gas imports. If 
left unrestricted, the carbon market could lead to very significant flows already in 2040, comparable 
to what OECD currently spend for oil imports, between US$ 500 and 700 Billion for a low and high 
oil price scenario, respectively. 
 
Limiting the purchase of international offsets to 10% of total abatement would keep the amount of 
transferred resources around US$ 100 Billion, though it would generate a global efficiency loss up 
to 35% in the mid-term. When considering the costs throughout the century, the penalty is lower, 
about 13%. This reduction is due to the path of technological change, which requires upfront 
investments but payoff in the long-term, after 2050. A limit to 15% would constrain outflows to 
US$ 200 Billion, twice as much as the 10% case, but with a significantly smaller penalty (17% until 
2050 and 7% until 2100). A further loosening of the trade constraint would marginally alleviate the 
extra economic loss (8% up to 2050 and 3% in the long-run) but it would not be very effective in 
controlling monetary transfers. In light of this, the intermediate limit of 15% of abatement to be met 
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Figure 3: Carbon market and financial transfers under different quantitative restrictions 
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4.3 Restrictions along the “where” dimension 
 In the last case, we turn to the situation in which an international carbon market already exists in 
2020, but some regions do not take part until 2045. As noted by Frankel (2008), it could be that the 
eligibility to sell permits is restricted to countries with good international governance ratings, or that 
commit to invest the revenue in green projects, or that have demonstrated ability to abide to 
commitments. We analyse the implications of delaying the participation of three groups of 
developing regions that in the global carbon market would play the role of net sellers: Energy 
Exporting Regions (Middle East and North Africa and Russia), Developing Asia (China and India) 
and Rest of World (Latin America and Sub-Saharan Africa). 
 
Excluding either region from the international carbon market has limited effects on global macro-
economic costs (Table 9), essentially because others compensate the absence of a seller with 
increased supply. The only case that leads to a visible additional global penalty is the exclusion of 
Developing Asia, which supplies more than 50% of the demand of permits. For example, the price 
of carbon in 2025 would double if Developing Asia were not included in the market, whereas it 
would increase by only a few percentage points if other regions were to delay. This result stems 
from the fact that emerging economies such as China and India are assumed to host the largest base 
of mitigation opportunities. It also reinforces the known argument that any climate policy has to 
look East to be effective. 
   19
Table 9: Regional macroeconomic losses of climate stabilisation policy when selected regions 
join cap-and-trade in 2045 (“where” dimension). Consumption losses discounted at 3% 
discount rate, 2005-2100 
  OECD Non-OECD  World 
Full offsets  1.68% 0.18%  1.07% 
DA join in 2045  1.82% 0.12%  1.14% 
ROW join in 2045  1.73% 0.16%  1.10% 
EEX join in 2045  1.73% 0.17%  1.10% 
Negative entries indicate consumption gains 
 
5.  Implications for the United States and Europe 
This section focuses on the United States and Europe, which have both proposed quantitative and 
qualitative limits on international offsets.  Figure 4 shows macroeconomic costs in the US and 
Europe when international offsets can be used freely and under different ceilings. Two different 
behaviours can be detected. For Europe, policy macroeconomic costs are quite sensitive to the 
tightening of the limit to trade. As shown in Table 6, Europe relies quite significantly on the 
international carbon market. Complete reliance on domestic abatement would result in a 
considerable economic cost, with mid-term consumption losses slightly above 3%. A 15% ceiling 
would induce a penalty of about 20%, though from a lower base compared to the US. 
 
Figure 4: Macroeconomic costs in Europe and United States under different quantitative 
restrictions on the use of international carbon offsets. Consumption losses discounted at 
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The US reports a mild sensitivity to restrictions in offsets, and actually a potential for short-term 
and mid-term welfare gain for limits of 20% and 15%. A 20% restriction would not be binding. As 
explained in Section 3, a non-binding ceiling generates benefits because it reduces the carbon price 
and thus, the expenditure for carbon credits. The 15% restriction is binding, but spillovers and the 
energy market effects compensate the additional costs, leading to short-term welfare gains and only 
to a 1% long-term additional penalty. A mild restriction could (slightly) ease the costs of the climate 
policy in the US, provided all OECD countries adhere to the same trade limit rule. This last 
condition is important because the US would profit from the reduction in oil prices and in 
investment costs of low carbon technologies induced by the tighter commitment in the rest of 
OECD, too.  Because equivalent offsets restrictions lead to relatively more abatement in Europe and 
other OECD countries, they also induce more investments in innovation outside the US. Europe has 
to comply with a 20% reduction by 2020, therefore it begins to invest in mitigation options earlier.  
 
As for CO2 prices, limiting the access to the international carbon market implies that marginal 
abatement costs are not equalised across countries. Permit buyers (sellers) would face a higher 
(lower) cost of carbon than the price of permits in the full offsets case. For example, a 15% limit on 
trade would raise the cost of carbon significantly more in Europe than in the US, as shown in Figure 
5. The US would have economic benefits from imposing a slightly higher carbon tax and relying 
less on international offsets, provided Europe and the rest of OECD were also willing to adopt 
equally stringent (but with a higher impact on marginal costs of abatement) measures. 
 
 
Figure 5. Marginal cost of carbon in Europe and US for a 15% limit on international offsets 
until 2045, and global carbon price when the market is not restricted   
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The 15% constraint is roughly in line with the Senate Bill proposal by Boxer and Kerry to limit the 
purchase of international offsets to 0.5 GtCO2 a year (half of the one passed in the Waxman-
Markey Bill, that in our simulations would not be binding). A constraint between 15 and 10% is 
also consistent with the upper bound set in the European Emission Trading Scheme (1.6-1.7 billion 
tons between 2008 and 2020). 
 
6.  Summary and conclusions 
The use of international carbon offsets in achieving climate stabilisation targets has always been a 
prominent issue in climate negotiations, but few studies have assessed its role in a second-best 
setting. This paper fills this gap by studying the macroeconomic and the financial consequences of 
international offsets when multiple externalities are considered. It provides a numerical evaluation 
of how different constraints on the size, timing, and participation to an international carbon market 
affect the macroeconomic costs of climate policy, international financial transfers and the stimulus 
to carry out innovation.  
 
We have shown that for a climate policy entailing deep emission cuts in OECD countries (-90% 
compared to 2005 in 2050), an unrestricted international carbon market would entail financial 
transfers that are initially small but that would grow very rapidly, equating today’s OECD gas 
imports in 2025 and today’s OECD oil imports in 2040.  
 
Limiting the access to international offsets provides an additional stimulus to innovation and 
deployment of low carbon technologies, and decreases the consumption of fossil fuels in OECD 
countries. International spillovers of both knowledge and experience extend the benefits of 
technological change to non-OECD regions as well. For moderate restrictions on international 
offsets, we found that technology spillovers and energy market effects can compensate the lower 
revenue from the carbon market. 
   
Figure 5 summarises the relationship between the size of carbon market and the economic costs of 
the climate policy. When moving from the full offsets hypothesis to the limiting case of no 
international offsets until 2045, the costs of the climate policy increases quite significantly, by about 
50%. However, the relation between trade limits and policy costs is quite flat for moderate 
restrictions. A limit of 15% (i.e. 85% of abatement must be achieved domestically) would be 
comparable to postponing trade between 2030 and 2035 or to exclude the larger seller from trade.   22
This would result in a slight global efficiency loss. Almost all penalties that arise from trade 
restrictions are borne by the developed countries, since developing countries are compensated by 
the positive externalities of technological change and energy market effects.   
 
 
Figure 5: Carbon market and global macroeconomic costs.  
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Policy costs in Europe are shown to be more sensitive to ceilings than those in the US, especially 
for the more stringent cases. An upper bound of 15% of abatement to be met via international 
carbon offsets would somewhat increase the policy costs in Europe (+20%) but actually bring about 
short-term welfare gains in the US. Such provision is in line with the rules discussed for the third 
Phase of the European Emission Trading Scheme and with the currently proposed Senate Bill by 
Boxer and Kerry. Weighting the effects on macroeconomic costs, financial flows, and innovation, 
our results indicate that a moderate quantitative limit to the use of international offsets, such as the 
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Appendix. The WITCH model 
 
Full details on the WITCH model can be found in Bosetti et al. (2007) and Bosetti et al. (2009). 
This appendix provides a brief summary of the model. It recalls the most distinguishing features 
related to environmental, economic, and technology externalities, and the game-theoretic set-up.   
 
Brief model description 
WITCH is a dynamic optimal growth model (“top-down”) with a “bottom-up” representation of the 
energy sector. It can be classified as a hybrid model. The geographical coverage is global and world 
regions are grouped into twelve macro-regions sharing economic, geographic, and energy 
similarities. These regions are USA (United States), WEURO (Western Europe), EEURO (Eastern 
Europe), KOSAU (Korea, South Africa, Australia), CAJANZ (Canada, Japan, New Zealand), TE 
(Transition Economies), MENA (Middle East and North Africa), SSA (Sub-Saharan Africa), 
SASIA (South Asia), CHINA (China and Taiwan), EASIA (South East Asia), LACA ( Latin 
America, Mexico and Caribbean).  
 
The WITCH model includes a range of technology options that describe the use of energy and 
power generation. Different fuels can be used for electricity generation and final consumption: coal, 
oil, gas, uranium, and biofuels. Electricity can be generated using a series of traditional fossil fuel-
based technologies and carbon-free options. Fossil fuel-based technologies include natural gas 
combined cycle (NGCC)and fuel oil and pulverised coal (PC) power plants. Coal-based electricity 
can also be generated using integrated gasification combined cycle production with carbon capture 
and sequestration (CCS). Low carbon technologies include hydroelectric and nuclear power, wind 
turbines and photovoltaic panels (Wind&Solar), and a breakthrough technology. A second backstop 
option is included in final consumption and it is meant to represent an alternative to oil in 
transportation such as hydrogen and advanced biofuels.  The model features endogenous technical 
change in the energy sector in the form of both Learning-By-Researching and Learning-By-Doing.  
 
The game-theoretic set-up makes it possible to capture the non-cooperative nature of international 
relationships. Climate change is the major global externality, but other economic externalities 
induce free-riding behaviours and strategic interactions. The model can produce two different 
solutions. The cooperative solution is globally optimal because it maximises global social welfare 
and it internalises environmental and economic externalities. It  represents a first-best optimum. The 
decentralised, or non-cooperative solution is strategically optimal for each given region (Nash   28
equilibrium), but it does not internalise externalities. It  represents a second-best optimum.  The 
Nash equilibrium is computed as an open-loop Nash equilibrium. It is the outcome of a non-
cooperative, simultaneous, open membership game with full information.  
 
The remaining of the Appendix describes in detail the environmental, technology, and economic 
externalities.  
 
The climate externality 
Long-lived Greenhouse Gases become perfectly mixed with other gases in the world atmosphere. 
No matter where the initial source of emission is located, it will affect global GHG concentrations 
and eventually global mean temperature and climate. For this reason, emissions from any source, 
anywhere in the world, give rise to a global negative externality. Long-lived GHGs remain in the 
atmosphere from decades to centuries. Present emissions build up over past emissions and increase 
the concentrations for very long temporal horizons. The WITCH model includes carbon cycle and 
climate modules that describe the international and intertemporal dimension of the global 
externality of GHG emissions.  
A climate module describes the physical relationship between GHG emissions, radiative forcing, 
and temperature. Temperature relative to pre-industrial levels increases through augmented 
radiative forcing of different GHGs. Radiative forcing in turn depends on CO2 and non-CO2 
atmospheric concentrations. Stoichiometric coefficients are applied to the use of fossil fuels to 
derive related CO2 emissions. Among non-CO2 gases, emissions of methane (CH4), Nitrous dioxide 
(N2O), short-lived fluorinated gases, (SLF, HFCs with lifetimes under 100 years) and long-lived 
fluorinated (LLF, HFC with long lifetime, PFCs, and SF6) are explicitly modelled. We also 
distinguish SO2 aerosols, which have a cooling effect on temperature.  
 
A reduced-form damage function, D(n,t), describes a relationship between regional damages and 
global mean temperature increase above pre-industrial levels, T(t). The quadratic functional form 
makes it possible to account for both gains and losses: 
2
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Physical impacts can be translated into monetary units by including the damage function into the 
final production function. Equation (A2) expresses climate change damages as fraction of final 
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International knowledge spillovers for energy enhancing R&D 
Investments in energy R&D build up a stock of knowledge (HE) that improves overall energy 
efficiency. The energy knowledge stock augments the quantity of final energy services (ES) that can 
be provided per unit of physical energy (EN), according to a Constant Elasticity formulation:  
() []
ES ES ES t n EN t n HE t n ES EN H
ρ ρ ρ α α
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Learning processes during knowledge accumulation or deployment of advanced technologies will 
not be confined within the boundaries of investing countries, but knowledge and expertise are likely 
to spill, with some lag, worldwide. Therefore, the generation of new ideas is characterised by an 
innovation possibility frontier that exhibits both intertemporal and international spillovers. At each 
point in time, new ideas (Z) are produced using a Cobb-Douglas combination between domestic 
investments (IR&D), the domestic stock of knowledge (HE), and the foreign stock of knowledge 
(SPILL):  
d c b
D R t n SPILL t n HE t n I a t n Z ) , ( ) , ( ) , ( ) , ( & =  (A4) 
The contribution of foreign knowledge is not immediate, but it depends on the interaction between 
two components shown in equation (A5). The first term describes countries’ absorptive capacity 
whereas the second one captures the distance of each region from the technology frontier. The 
technology frontier is represented by the stock of knowledge in high-income countries (USA, 
WEURO, EEURO, KOSAU, and CAJANZ): 
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The flow of new ideas (Z) adds to the previously cumulated stock and generates the total amount of 
knowledge available to each country at each point in time:  
) 1 )( , ( ) , ( 1 , &D R t n HE t n  Z )  t HE(n δ − + = +  (A6) 
International experience spillovers for wind and solar 
WITCH represents the diffusion of technologies and experience in some niche technologies such as 
Wind&Solar. The rapid and recent development of wind turbines and photovoltaic panels has led to 
a reduction in investment costs. A learning curve in wind and solar technologies captures the 
empirically-observed relationship between declining investments costs and installed capacity, an 
effect which is known as Learning-By-Doing. Investment costs in new Wind and Solar capital, 
() t n SC , , decrease with the world installed capacity,  ( ) ∑n j t n K ,:  
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We assume full technology spillover: investments in additional capacity by virtuous regions drive 
down investment costs worldwide within a model time period, which corresponds to five years. The 
progress ratio, PR, defines the speed of learning.  
 
International knowledge and experience spillovers in breakthrough technologies 
The WITCH model includes two backstop technologies. These are innovative technologies with 
low or zero carbon emissions that are currently not commercialised and that necessitate dedicated 
innovation investments to become economically competitive and available in large supplies.  For 
the purpose of modelling, a backstop technology can be seen of as a compact representation of a 
portfolio of advanced technologies that would become available before a few decades. The costs of 
these technologies are modelled with a two-factor learning curve. The unit cost of each backstop 
technology,  t tec P , , evolves over time with technology deployment,  t tec CC ,  and the accumulation of a 
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The stock of R&D accumulates with the perpetual rule and with the contribution of international 
knowledge spillovers, SPILL: 
 
β α δ T tec T tec T tec T tec SPILL D IR D R D R , , , 1 , & ) 1 ( & & + − = +                    (A8) 
 
The two exponents are the Learning-by-Doing index ( b − ) and the Learning-by-Researching index 
( c − ) and they define the speed of learning. The learning ratio lr is the rate at which costs decline 
each time the cumulative capacity doubles, while lrs is the rate at which costs decline at the 
doubling of the knowledge stock. 
We set the initial prices of the backstop technologies at roughly 10 times the 2005 price of 
commercial equivalents. The cumulative deployment of the technology is initiated at an arbitrarily 
low value, 1,000twh and 1,000EJ for the electric and non-electric, respectively. Backstop 
technologies are assumed to be renewable in the sense that the fuel cost component is negligible. 
The backstop for power generation is assumed to operate at load factors comparable with those of 
baseload power generation. 
Backstops substitute linearly nuclear power in the electric sector, and oil in the non-electric one. 
Once backstop technologies become competitive, their uptake is not immediate and complete, but 
rather we assume a transition/adjustment period. These penetration limits capture the inertia in the 
system, as large deployment of these advanced technologies will require investment and re-
organisation in energy infrastructure. At each point in time, the upper limit is equal to 5% of energy 
produced by other technologies and the backstop itself in the previous period.  
 
International energy markets 
The markets of exhaustible resources are assumed to be integrated and they are represented as an 
international market for each fuel. International prices depend on fossil fuels extraction, which in 
turn is driven by regional consumption. 
The model considers four non-renewable fuels: coal, crude oil, natural gas, and uranium. Their costs 
follow a long-term trend that reflects their exhaustibility. Resource prices are calculated 
endogenously using a reduced-form cost function that allows for non-linearity in both the depletion 
effect and in the rate of extraction. Assuming competitive markets, the domestic price  ( ) t n Pf ,  is 
equal to the marginal cost and it depends on the cumulative quantity of fossil fuels extracted, Qf 
(n,t):   32
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where  () n f χ  is a regional markup,  f Q is the amount of total resources at time t, and  () n f π  
measures the relative importance of the depletion effect. Cumulative extraction depends on the 
demand for fossil fuels of all 12 regions in the model:  
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Cumulative extraction depends on  the amount of fuel f extracted in region n at time t,  ( ) t n X extr f , , .  
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